Tuesday, October 9, 2012

Understanding Globalization: Past, Present, and Future

Few phenomena have changed human society more drastically in recent decades than economic globalization. While people have always traded across borders and international commerce and finance have been important for centuries, most of the world’s major national economies were relatively closed up until the 1960s. Businesses operated primarily in their own national markets, balanced out by national governments and civil society structures such as labor rights groups and environmental advocacy organizations. One clear example of this was the U.S. car industry, which was headquartered in Detroit, bargained with the national United Auto Workers labor union (UAW), and produced and sold cars almost exclusively within the U.S. market. Under this system, a handful of industrialized wealthy nations formed the “center” of the world economy, while the traditional agricultural societies of the developing world remained on the “periphery”, with limited participation in the production and consumption of manufactured goods and an overall focus on the export of raw materials such as agricultural foodstuffs, oil and minerals. During this period, Brazil was a classic case of a country on the periphery: a poor society of rural peasants whose national economy was dependent on the export of coffee and rubber to the U.S., Western Europe and Japan.


1971-2012: Changing Patterns of Economic Trade

This global order began to rapidly change in the 1970s and 1980s based on a few key factors. New advances in shipping, trucking and railways caused transport costs to plunge, while advances in information and communication technology (computers, telephones, the Internet) reduced the barriers caused by distance. This made trade between countries significantly cheaper and reduced the benefits of local production. Liberalizing reforms and macroeconomic stabilization programs in major developing countries such as Mexico, Brazil, China and India helped to modernize these countries’ economies and unleash their potential. Government efforts to promote free trade and reduce protectionism opened up markets both in the center and on the periphery. The end of the gold standard and the Bretton-Woods financial system led to new, free floating currency markets and a new global financial order where capital could flow more freely between countries.

All of these developments enabled supply chains to finally become international, as firms began to operate across borders and take advantage of lower production costs in developing countries, primarily due to cheaper labor. Customer bases also expanded and domestic companies suddenly began to invade their rivals’ home turf (think of the expansion of Toyota and Volkswagen in the U.S.). With big businesses going from national to multinational, an incredible opportunity for knowledge transfer opened up. Whereas countries used to have to build their own domestic supply chains from scratch (such as Japan’s incredible transformation during the Meiji Restoration or Latin America’s failed approach of Import Substitution Industrialization), it suddenly became much easier for developing countries to learn on the go as multinational firms set up shop locally and shared their technological capacity and know-how, thus allowing for easier integration into global markets.

No country better exemplifies this approach than China, which established itself as the world’s low-cost manufacturing center while forcing multinational companies to work in tandem with domestic partners to stimulate knowledge transfer and “indigenous innovation”. (This topic has become polemical in discussions with Western businesses, many of whom believe the Chinese government has actively promoted the theft of their intellectual property.) China’s rapid growth itself had a profound effect on global trade patterns, as the country’s sheer size means that the share of the world’s population living in “central” economies has more than doubled in the last few decades, rebalancing the traditional center vs. periphery dynamic.

Today’s Global Economy: Advantages and Problems

As a result of this process of economic change, the world looks drastically different today than it did 50 years ago. “Emerging markets” have become a hot topic in discussions of international business and politics, as the BRIC powers continue to gain in prominence and the “Rise of the Rest” is reshaping the global order. The concept of the “center” and the “periphery” is quickly becoming an outdated relic of 20th century international relations. Across the world, people have seen their living standards rise as millions emerge from extreme poverty and become integrated into the global economy. After having accelerated for over 150 years (since the dawn of the industrial revolution), global inequality is finally falling. Globalization has without a doubt been a huge boon for the world’s poor.

These economic trends have not been uniformly positive, however. Globalization has led to much anxiety for the middle class of the traditionally powerful economies of the center. In the U.S., newly multinational firms began to move much of their supply chains overseas. This development—combined with advances in automation that replaced many workers with robots and machines—led to a drastic reduction of domestic manufacturing jobs, causing once-dynamic cities in the industrial heartland such as Detroit and Pittsburgh to fall into decline and neglect. Much noise has since been made in political circles about the scourge of outsourcing and the need to defend domestic workers by increasing protectionist barriers once again. Also, with international competition squeezing margins, multinational firms were forced to cut costs to stay alive, holding wages down and thus hurting the middle class further. Inequality has steadily crept upward as a result, with the well-educated workers of the “knowledge-based economy” pulling ahead of their peers. These trends were masked for a while by a large expansion of credit and a debt-fueled consumption boom that burst during the 2008 financial crisis, a similar event to the 1929 market crash that was in many ways caused by a structural employment shift from agriculture to manufacturing.

To understand these trends, it is important to realize that the last thirty years of economic globalization have undermined the careful capital vs. labor balance that underpinned the success of the middle class in the economies of the center during most of the 20th century. In the early decades of the industrial revolution, capital reigned supreme as wealthy industrialists made massive profits while forcing their workers to endure terrible working conditions for meager salaries. Many derisively referred to these powerful businessmen as “robber barons”. This laissez-faire free-for-all system came under enormous criticism, most notably from economist Karl Marx, whose influential and poignant critiques laid the foundation for the labor rights movement, which fought to ensure fair wages, safer working conditions, progressive tax structures and the establishment of the welfare state to guarantee retirement programs, health care and other benefits.

The success of the labor movement led to a healthy equilibrium between capital and labor. Businesses continued to grow and improve productivity, thus driving economic development, while labor organizers and their partners in civil society and government guaranteed that the benefits from such growth were, at least to a certain extent, shared by all. During this period, governments also increased their regulatory powers in areas such as antitrust enforcement and environmental protection. This stable equilibrium, organized under national economies, was the norm for the economies of the center through the 1960s.

Economic globalization changed this dynamic drastically. As firms became multinational, capital once again gained the upper hand. Although the economy continued to grow, workers lost the ability to negotiate as fear of outsourcing weakened their leverage in discussions. Governments felt pressured to slash their regulatory frameworks and tax regimes, fearing that stricter measures and higher taxes would cause multinationals to leave and set up shop in a country with a more hands-off approach. This has led to a so-called “race to the bottom”, where the countries with the lowest wages and taxes are able to attract more companies, even if this undermines their goal of building a middle class and a social safety net.

One of the best examples of this dynamic is the current political discussion in the U.S. over the corporate tax rate. In the 1950s and 1960s, when the economy was doing well, the corporate tax rate hovered at around 50%. It has since come down significantly due to the government’s desire to boost national competitiveness (it now stands at 35%). With the country’s growing fiscal crisis due to the aging of its population, politicians are now placed in a tough situation regarding the future of the tax rate: increase taxes to boost revenue and risk slowing economic growth as competitiveness falls, or keep taxes low and slash benefits for the upcoming generation of retirees. France’s recent proposal to raise taxes to solve its fiscal woes has also come under scrutiny, as leading businessmen have announced their intention to leave the country.

In addition to weakening fiscal policy, his situation has created perverse incentives for countries to loosen their regulatory and labor laws to jumpstart their economic development. In Brazil, for example, rather than developing rigorous antitrust regulation to prevent monopolies, the government has encouraged consolidation as a way to create “national champions” that can compete abroad, despite the effects this can have on domestic consumers. It is not alone in this regard. The growing benefit of size in the international economy has set off a wave of consolidations in various industries, from defense and airlines to logistics and mining, and national governments are eager for their companies to emerge with the upper hand. Furthermore, the growing pressure to improve competitiveness is beginning to undermine some of the labor protections industrial societies carefully built over the last century: overnight working is beginning to return in Western manufacturing centers, and the “right-to-work” movement has been growing even in the U.S. industrial heartland, further weakening the power of labor unions. In a world where capital is globalized and labor and government are not, it is difficult to avoid this sort of race to the bottom, as multinational businesses essentially are not forced to answer to any ultimate authority.

Finding a Way Forward: Deepening Integration

Given these problems, many are tempted to reverse course on globalization, arguing that we must return to the days of national economies, when capital was tamed by powerful civil society groups and government agencies. I do not support such an anti-globalization message. First, technological and economic changes are here to stay, and we cannot simply go back in time. Second, to do so would be to condemn many developing countries back to the periphery, abandoning the world’s poor and creating an unequal world order. This is not a realistic or desirable possibility.

To move ahead and correct the current global economic imbalances, we must deepen our economic integration. To counteract the power of global firms, we must have a global civil society and global governance structure. International labor rights standards, environmental regulations, standardized tax regimes and social welfare programs will ultimately be necessary to combat the problems caused by globalization. A sovereign central authority charged with representing the interests of all of humanity’s individuals is the only way to ultimately create the balance needed for a well-functioning and fair global economy. In addition to creating a more healthy economic equilibrium, global governance will be important to solving issues such as poverty alleviation, peace and security, and international human rights and democracy.

While a global government may seem like an unrealistic, far-fetched idea, I am confident that humanity is slowly but surely moving toward this path. It will be a long journey, probably taking multiple centuries, but I believe the end result is inevitable. Humanity is integrated today in a way it has never been before: we have instant global communication, ease of travel, a universal lingua franca (English), and new international governance structures that are slowly getting stronger and more effective over time, such as the United Nations, the G-20, and the World Trade Organization.

There are many challenges to building global governance, but there are two key steps that we can take moving forward. The first involves breaking down existing protectionist barriers that separate national economies by promoting international free trade agreements and the free movement of people. Both of these are difficult politically, as nearly every society in the world is highly resistant to liberalizing reforms to connect markets and loosen immigration controls. The second is the promotion of regional integration, as this is probably a necessary prelude to full, global integration. I have written previously about these sorts of efforts, and believe very strongly that they are ultimately pivotal to strengthening globalization. The current situation in the Euro Zone is thus a huge test for humanity’s future. If Europe’s political leaders can keep the euro intact and further integrate their economies in a successful way, it will be a model for other regions to imitate in the future. If they fail, the collapse of the euro will set global governance back for a long time to come.

I have suggested this future for global governance to several people before, and am normally met with quite a bit of skepticism. This is understandable. After all, few in early 19th century Europe would have believed that the myriad states of Germany and Italy would successfully unite into single countries. And few in post-World War II Europe would have believed that the continent would soon be united into a single currency zone with federal powers. Over the millennia of human society, we have slowly and steadily consolidated sovereignty at increasingly higher levels. We began as local bands of hunters and gatherers, moved into larger tribes and villages, then into city-states and military empires, and now live primarily under the sovereignty of nation-states. I see no reason why further consolidation should not occur, especially given the economic trends of the last thirty years. Global governance may not be around the corner, but I believe that we are marching toward such an inevitable future for humanity, and will ultimately be better off because of it.

Thursday, October 4, 2012

The "Culture" Question


One of the most longstanding and polemical debates among development specialists involves a very delicate topic: the impact of culture on a society’s economic performance. Many people look at the wealth of countries such as the U.S., Germany, Japan and Israel and conclude that their success is based on shared values of hard work and respect for rules and order. They compare these attitudes to the apparent chaos and laid-back attitudes of the populations in Greece, Italy, India and Brazil and argue that culture is the deterministic factor of these countries’ economic woes. Others dismiss such analysis off the bat, believing such attitudes to be ignorant and prejudiced and arguing instead that historical factors such as colonialism and past economic exploitation offer better explanations of modern discrepancies. I have spent much time carefully reflecting on this question during my stay here in Brazil, and would like to finally address the issue in this post.

The truth is that both of these extremes are somewhat incorrect. Both are overly simplistic ways to reach a quick conclusion without doing the difficult intellectual work of analyzing societies in depth to understand why different communities react to certain circumstances in different ways. Yet both perspectives do have important points to make, so I will analyze each in turn.

Culture absolutely matters. Anyone from a more developed country who spends time in a less developed one will quickly notice how clear cultural differences impact a society’s functioning on a daily basis. Whether it is respecting the rules of the road in traffic, arriving at meetings on time, reliably executing long-term planning, or organizing procedures in simple and efficient ways, there is a wide spectrum of behaviors and outcomes that vary across countries. This collection of norms and procedures is an important element of a society’s human capital (see previous post) and plays a large role in determining productivity. Those who reject outright the importance of culture are ignoring a key piece of the puzzle and thus fail to see a holistic picture of the development process.

Yet, although culture is clearly important, those who emphasize its impact while failing to elaborate (think Mitt Romney’s comments in Israel) also show a limited understanding of development. To really understand the impact of culture, it is necessary to dig deeper to understand the incentives in place in a certain society and how these incentives can evolve over time. While an outsider can look at a certain culture and dismiss it as inefficient or primitive, they will not truly be able to understand without spending extended time within that culture and witnessing the constant incentives reinforcing those same behaviors.

Let’s take two simple, easy-to-understand examples: driving in traffic and arriving to meetings on time. Out-of-control driving and habitual tardiness are common hallmarks of the developing world. In countries as diverse as Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt, India and Indonesia, Western visitors habitually complain about these two common behaviors. Yet spend some time in any of these countries and you will quickly learn to adjust. Rigidly following the “rules of the road” and extreme punctuality quickly prove futile in a society where no one else abides by such behaviors. People in these societies are not “uncivilized” and do not suffer from cultural failings: they are simply responding as rational actors within a given system, just as any human being would.

Furthermore, many in the West take our current culture for granted as “normal” without understanding its historical origins and evolution. When automobiles first became popular in the U.S., we did not all drive around in a calm and orderly fashion, stopping for pedestrians and politely taking turns at intersections. Historically in the U.S., driving was just as chaotic as it now is in much of the developing world. Similarly, we were not always as punctual as we are today. As we moved from rural, agrarian societies—where the lifestyle is less rushed and time is often measured by the position of the sun in the sky—to more fast-paced, dynamic urban communities, we over time became more strict regarding time management.

What, then, made us change? The answer is straightforward: incentives. Traffic laws and increasing enforcement changed behavior on the road, as people began to drive more cautiously to avoid punishment and such conduct became rooted over time as a cultural norm. Stricter expectations of punctuality and results-oriented work changed the dynamic in many business environments. Societies’ rules and governance, directed through public policy and business practices, can change over time and help culture to evolve. After all, culture is hardly static; the growing participation of women and minorities in the public arena and workforce in the U.S. serves as a useful testament to this fact. As former senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan famously quipped, “The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change culture and save it from itself.”

A casual Western visitor to Brazil may complain that the local culture seems too laid-back or inefficient. Brazilians themselves are quick to voice this criticism of their society to outsiders: a former central bank chief recently said that the country could not develop more without first “changing the Brazilian people.” I do not subscribe to such a pessimistic outlook. I look at Brazil and see a country in the midst of a profound and rapid cultural transition. Just a generation ago, the majority of the country’s population consisted of subsistence farmers detached from much of industrial society. Now, the country is highly urban, with a rapidly growing middle class full of educated professionals far more integrated into the global economy. Norms and behaviors, as well as public policies, are changing quickly. As for driving culture, the growing use of speed cameras, traffic police, and sobriety checkpoints is beginning to change the rules of the road. I believe that this serves as an apt metaphor for the changing incentive structure of Brazilian society, and its ultimate impact on the country’s culture and productivity. While Brazilians may not share the traditional intensity associated with the German or Chinese public, there is little doubt in my mind that, by strengthening institutions and introducing sensible public policies and enforcement measures, they will continue to develop their society over the decades to come, and finally put to rest the idea of culture as the deterministic factor for success.

Wednesday, September 26, 2012

Measuring Brazil’s Wealth: Physical, Human, and Natural Resources

When we look at a country’s level of economic development, the first number we tend to focus on is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The total sum of a country’s yearly production of goods and services, GDP figures and growth rates offer key insights into an economy’s overall size, its level of economic dynamism, and the wealth of its population. Yet, as most students learn in Economics 101, GDP numbers cannot in themselves tell the story of a society’s development because they do not take into account crucial factors such as inequality, political structure, quality of life, or pollution levels. To truly understand any economy, we need to look at a variety of economic indicators.

Concepts of Capital and the “Inclusive Wealth Index”

One of the most important figures to consider when measuring wealth is capital formation. Traditional development theory suggests that measurements of gross capital formation are key to understanding a country’s economic trajectory, as they give an idea of much of its resources the country is devoting to investments that will improve productivity and enable business activity to expand. Mathematical formulas such as the Harrod-Domar Model essentially tried to establish simple rules to explain the development process in these terms: the more capital a country accumulates, the more developed it becomes. I have mentioned this briefly in previous posts, comparing ratios of capital per worker in Brazil, India and China as an important gauge of each country’s future potential.

Yet measurements of capital formation also tend to have a fatal flaw: they focus on a very narrow definition of what constitutes “capital”. These measurements normally refer to physical capital: the tools, machinery and infrastructure we use in our daily lives to make each individual worker more productive. To be sure, physical capital is vitally important. It would take a group of construction workers much longer to build a house if they had no saws, trucks, cranes or drills. In my daily life here in Brazil, I see the significant difference in physical capital accumulation in comparison with the U.S., where state-of-the-art equipment allows for much greater efficiency in various activities, thus enabling us to generate more wealth per person.

But physical capital is not the only factor that determines the productivity of a given set of workers. In its new “Inclusive Wealth Index”, the U.N. has determined that a country’s productive base is made up of physical capital, human capital (ability of the workers themselves) and natural capital (resources such as land, oil and gas, water and minerals). There is also a lingering academic debate about whether to include financial capital, the ability of a country’s financial sector to channel investment and savings into productivity-improving activities, but for the purposes of this column I will put that consideration aside.

To understand Brazil’s future, it is therefore key to understand its formation of physical, human and natural capital. I will go through these three items in turn.

Physical Capital

As I mentioned in my recent post on infrastructure, Brazil’s physical capital accumulation has stalled over the last three decades. In addition to not investing enough in its roads, trains, ports and airports, Brazil has not been accumulating enough machinery and equipment to make its economy more productive. Improving infrastructure has become a top priority for the government, but it remains to be seen how much effect new reforms and spending programs will have in this area. In order to increase physical capital more generally, it will be necessary for Brazil to do a better job in promoting savings and investment as well as enacting liberalizing reforms. This must be a top priority for Ms. Rousseff if she is serious about fulfilling her promise to tackle Brazil’s lingering competitiveness problems.

Human Capital

Brazil has done a better job over the last thirty years of improving its human capital stock. A traditionally nebulous term, human capital has gained ground in recent years as a useful way of understanding the differences in productivity among groups of workers with the same physical resources at their disposal. This, of course, depends on many factors, such as how healthy the workers are, their level of educational attainment, what skillsets they possess, and what norms and behaviors guide their ability to work together as a group.

Progress on education and health care are easier to measure through statistics and are normally the two go-to concepts people think about when they think of human capital. Brazil has made much progress on these fronts, though more certainly needs to be done moving forward.

While the country has made significant strides in universalizing education and developing internationally-recognized flagship universities, its public education system still remains weak overall, especially in comparison to East Asian tigers such as China and South Korea. Overall test scores have shown signs of progress in recent years, and the government is working on a new “National Education Plan” to be finalized in 2014 that should increase investment in equipment, infrastructure and salaries, help to create a national standardized curriculum and promote experimentation with streamlining management, improving teacher training and evaluation, and lengthening the school day. As in the U.S., many issues of education reform are quite polemical and there are heated debates regarding merit pay, “teaching to the test” and the importance of poverty as a performance indicator. Also similar to the U.S., much experimentation has gone on so far at the local level, and recent reforms in the Rio municipal school district have shown promise. Like Americans, Brazilians are very aware of the failures of their public education system and the importance of tackling this problem in order to improve the country’s global competitiveness.

Health care has also improved greatly over the last few decades, thanks in large part to the expanding reach of the country’s public health care system, known as SUS. Considered a pioneer in Latin America, SUS offers free medical care to all comers and has greatly expanded access to health care for Brazil’s poor. The country's successful response to the AIDS crisis has often been toted as a model for the developing world. Yet SUS has come under heavy criticism in recent years for its inability to provide quality care. The upper and middle classes prefer to seek treatment in private facilities, and private care as a percentage of health care spending is even higher in Brazil than in the U.S., which does not even have a universal public health care program. And as a tropical country, Brazil faces some particularly difficult health care challenges as it seeks to rein in diseases such as malaria and dengue. Health care is a heated discussion topic in the ongoing municipal election campaigns, and there is no doubt that expanding and strengthening the government’s public health programs will be pivotal in improving the country’s human capital.

Aside from education and health care, other forms of human capital are not as easy to quantify and analyze. These have to do with the rules and norms governing interactions among citizens. Part of this has to do with developing strong institutions that contribute to a country’s long-term economic dynamism. I have written previously about several forms of institutional development, such as promoting political stability and pluralistic democracy, reducing corruption, enhancing  interpersonal trust, and increasing mechanisms for project planning and execution. I will write in the future about other institutional issues such as reshaping cultural norms and promoting an independent, efficient judiciary to strengthen the rule of law. Institution building along these lines is the hardest development to track in quantitative terms, but I believe that it is where Brazil has made the most drastic progress over the last few decades and will continue to improve in the future. While such gains may not fit neatly onto a simple chart comparing countries’ economic development, they represent an absolutely pivotal part of the human capital formation process. By strengthening society’s norms and interactions, we strengthen the ability of our workforce to cooperate in productive endeavors, thus accelerating the process of economic development. 

Natural Capital

Natural capital may be the easiest of the three concepts to understand, as it generally refers to a country’s natural resources. Some of these resources may be extracted for one-time use and are thus diminished over time, such as oil and gas reserves or mineral deposits. Others can replenish themselves if cared for properly, such as water, land, and forest resources.

Knowing how to manage one’s natural resources is thus a crucial element for a country to build its capital base. In this case, accumulating physical capital (tools) and human capital (know-how) is sometimes necessary in order to utilize one’s natural capital. Good examples of this are Brazil’s large offshore oil projects, mountain mining initiatives, hydroelectric dam structures, and agricultural development programs, which have all required high amounts of investment and technical expertise. Having developed strong specialties in these areas, Brazil has been able to take advantage of its huge natural resources to develop a competitive economy in the commodities sector.

Brazil’s other challenge in this regard is to make reductions in natural capital sustainable. This means not only protecting reusable resources to prevent irreversible environmental damage (as I discuss in a previous post on sustainable development), but also offsetting reductions in natural capital with increases in other forms of capital accumulation. The U.N. Inclusive Wealth Report indicates that an economy can be considered sustainable if a drop in natural capital is balanced out by an increase in physical or human capital. An example of this would be Brazil using its new oil revenues to invest in infrastructure and public education. If such investments are not made, however, then the country can end up wasting its natural resources windfall. The U.N. report indicates that Brazil’s trajectory over the last decade has indeed been sustainable, as a drop in natural capital was more than offset by an increase in human capital formation. But Brazilians should not be complacent on this front, especially as the profits from the coming oil boom will no doubt become a major temptation for greedy politicians.

A more complete look at Brazil’s process of capital accumulation shows that the country has many chances ahead to improve productivity in a variety of ways and accelerate its development process. Investments in infrastructure, machinery and equipment, education, health care, institutional development and natural resource extraction and conservation will all be crucial for increasing wealth and solidifying the gains of the last few decades. These are the keys to improving Brazil’s competitiveness in the 21st century global economy.

Monday, September 3, 2012

Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Crime and Trust in Latin America

When foreigners visit Brazil, one of the first things they tend to notice is the heavy security presence everywhere they go. Houses and apartment buildings are hidden behind high walls and electric fences, private guards stand at the entrances to stores and shopping malls, and cameras everywhere remind passers-by that they are constantly being filmed. Visitors also quickly become aware of how cautious local residents tend to be in their daily lives, whether it involves going out on the street, leaving doors unlocked, or stopping a car at a red light.

For those unaccustomed to this world, it can be a difficult reality to adjust to. In many ways, it makes Brazil feel unwelcoming and reinforces the perception that this is a society rigidly divided along class lines, where interaction between groups is fairly limited. It is easy to feel trapped in a bubble, moving from gated sanctuary to gated sanctuary, unable to wander freely and securely. Whereas in the U.S. it is common for people to spend time playing in their yards and many scoff at the us-versus-them “Gated Community Mentality”, in Brazil it is accepted as fact that any worthwhile property will need a heavy layer of protection in order to be livable.

Yet, after spending more time in this country, it becomes much easier to understand the “bunker mentality” of many Brazilians. Simply put, these communities are very dangerous. I have heard enough personal accounts of armed break-ins, kidnappings, and car thefts to understand that the intense security truly is necessary for people to feel safe. Violent crime in Brazil has long been legendary; tourists in Rio are constantly advised to remain on guard against kidnapping, carjacking, and armed robbery. The past few decades have seen the problem become more acute: the national homicide rate has jumped from 11.7 murders per 100,000 people in 1980 to 26.2 in 2010, putting it on par with infamously chaotic Somalia.

Aside from creating the need for a ubiquitous security presence, Brazil’s crime problem has an even more pernicious effect on society: the erosion of interpersonal trust. Because of the need to constantly be on guard against potential threats, Brazilians are trained instinctively to be distrustful of strangers. This effect has been studied closely through so-called international “trust surveys” where respondents are asked whether, in general, it is ok to confide in others or whether it is better to be more cautious. Brazil consistently comes out toward the bottom of these rankings, as shown by this “World Map of Interpersonal Trust”:




It should be pointed out that Brazil is not alone in this regard. The Latin America region overall is known for high crime rates and low levels of interpersonal trust, measured annually in the Latinobarometro surveys. While Brazil may be the most extreme example of this issue, the trust deficit is also widening in countries like Mexico that are bogged down in endless drug wars that have led to spikes in violence. Even Chile, considered the most stable and prosperous of Latin American nations, compares unfavorably to the OECD countries on this important indicator.

While the importance of interpersonal trust may seem somewhat nebulous, it should not be overlooked. Latin America is still undergoing a period of democratic consolidation, and institution-building is an essential priority to creating open, inclusive societies with dynamic economies. When people do not trust each other, it becomes more difficult to build efficient legal systems and bureaucracies and there are more barriers to promoting economic interactions. Societies become less cohesive and participatory and people separate themselves more and more into isolated enclaves. Any attempts to create pluralistic democracies will be undermined if a country is plagued by a persistent trust deficit.

When looking for factors to explain Latin America’s crime and trust problems, many people tend to point out inequality. Countries with high rates of inequality, such as Brazil, tend to have high crime rates and low levels of interpersonal trust, whereas more equal countries such as Norway and Sweden tend to have the lowest crime rates and the highest levels of trust. As the most unequal region in the world, it should come as no surprise that Latin America has the highest trust deficit as well. Unequal societies are a natural breeding ground for crime because they create supply (material wealth concentrated in the hands of a few) as well as demand (poor people with either resentment of the rich or the desire to imitate the lavish lifestyles they witness daily).

But the other closely-related factor that is sometimes overlooked is in many ways more direct: the presence of “law-and-order” institutions. While inequality may sow the conditions for crime, it is a breakdown in policing structures that makes it viable. Often, therefore, violent crime tends to spike in periods of transition between established orders. Recent research has noted that Brazil’s upswing in crime came about during the fall of the military dictatorship and the transition to democracy. A similar phenomenon was observed during the collapse of apartheid in South Africa and, so far, the Mubarak regime in Egypt. These examples underscore a point that often is not recognized in discussions about crime: transitions from dictatorship to democracy are often accompanied by waves of violence that erode societal trust and create barriers to forming new, inclusive institutions. Indonesia, another country that recorded low levels of interpersonal trust on the map above, is still going through a democratic consolidation process that began in 1998 and has seen sporadic outbreaks of violence and secessionist movements. While traveling in China in 2008, I was struck by how safe I felt wherever I went; the country’s highly fortified police presence, while meant primarily to quell domestic unrest, made it easier to feel relaxed and secure. In a chaotic transition period, it is easy to imagine how a sudden power vacuum can lead to a surge in crime.

In Brazil, the surge in the murder rate occurred during the transitional decades of the 1980s and 1990s, when the nation was working to consolidate a new democratic regime. The murder rate has dropped slightly since 2003, though it remains much higher than pre-1980 levels:




This suggests that the worst may have passed, and that steady improvements in policing and reductions in inequality could slowly enable the country to overcome its violent past. It is, of course, an incredibly complex challenge to break the cycle between low interpersonal trust, high crime rates, and high inequality. There are no quick fixes and simple solutions. But success stories indicate that progress is indeed possible. Much has been made of the fall in crime rates in the U.S. and the numerous attempts to identify the key factors. Brazil’s Southeast region has seen a similarly stunning decline, with the homicide rate falling by 48.6% in Rio and 67.0% in São Paulo between 2000 and 2010. (Unfortunately, this was somewhat negated on a national level by spikes in violent crimes in the North and Northeast.) As in the U.S., no single analysis has emerged to clarify the underlying causes. At the very least, the figures provide reason for optimism that Brazil can ultimately turn the corner on this issue.

The next few decades will be a crucial test for Brazil to address this lingering problem. It is a shame that people here constantly have to walk around with their guard up and feel that living in gated communities is the only way to have a house with a yard and a social environment where people can interact openly with their neighbors. If the nation can finally bring violent crime under control and create an environment where citizens feel relatively safe out on the streets and in their houses, it may help to solidify interpersonal trust and reduce the need for omnipresent heavy security apparatuses. For a nation that prides itself on being warm and receptive to outsiders, that would be a truly welcome change.